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YOU ONLY LIVE TWICE: HOW THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IMPACTS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN SECOND LIFE
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a life beyond your wildest dreams-you live in a marvelous
house, enjoy a fabulous career, come home to a beautiful family, and have
more money than you know how to spend. All of this is possible in your
Second Life. Second Life is a computer-generated community in which
people can create virtual lives to escape the monotony of their regular
lives.' In Second Life, people have the opportunity to rewrite their lives,
indulge their fantasies, and explore a world without the limitations of rules
and consequences. 2 Indeed, many use their Second Lives for less-than-
honorable ventures, thereby presenting the issue of whether certain conduct
in Second Life should subject the user to real-world regulations and legal
consequences.3
This Comment explores whether virtual child pornography, as it
appears "In-world,"4 should be protected as free speech under the First
Amendment. 5 While the First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,",6 the
Constitution does not protect all categories of speech.7 Child pornography,
a long-recognized exception, falls outside the scope of First Amendment
protection because society's interest in protecting children outweighs its
interest in protecting this form of speech. However, unless and until the
1. See Second Life, FAQ-Frequently Asked Questions,
http://secondlife.com/whatis/faq.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) [hereinafter FAQ].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. "In-world" refers to the activity that exists and transpires in the virtual society of Second
Life. This locale is also referred to as the "World."
5. See discussion infra Part IV.B. l.a. In Second Life, virtual pornography is created when
the identities of two users have virtual sex In-world. When one of the identities is a child, it
becomes virtual child pornography.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not a
form of constitutionally protected speech).
8. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (recognizing that the First Amendment
does not protect child pornography).
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Supreme Court carves out a new First Amendment exception for virtual
child pornography, the government may only prohibit such material if it
harms real children in a manner comparable to harms caused by real child
pornography.
9
Virtual child pornography presents a unique problem in this modem
age of rapidly increasing advancements in technology.' 0  Enhanced
computer graphics allow pornographers to manipulate images in a variety
of ways: (1) real children may appear virtual; (2) virtual children may
appear life-like; and/or (3) non-sexual images may be transformed into
sexual images." Because the First Amendment legally protects obviously
virtual 2 child pornography from prosecution, 3 some worry that alleged
pedophiles who use Second Life to have cyber sex with virtual children
(who are, presumably, operated by adults 14) will evade prosecution because
pornographic images of virtual sex cannot reasonably be mistaken to depict
real children engaged in sexual activity. 15  This Comment argues that,
despite the assumed deviancy of such behavior, 16 cyber sex in Second Life
with computer-generated children does not harm real children.' 7  Thus,
real-world prosecution of such In-world behavior violates the First
Amendment because such behavior is merely a form of real-world
"protected" speech.
Part II of this Comment outlines the development of First Amendment
law and specifically, the categories of unprotected speech. It then explores
the child pornography exception at length, discussing recent legislative
attempts to expand child pornography law to proscribe virtual images, and
the Court's response to each endeavor. Part III describes the World
9. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (dismissing legislative
findings that virtual child pornography actually harms children, albeit less directly than real child
pornography).
10. See, e.g., Caroline Meek-Prieto, Note, Just Age Playing Around? How Second Life Aids
and Abets Child Pornography, 9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 88 (2008).
11. A computer-savvy user can morph images of real children posing innocently for the
camera into sexually explicit positions.
12. For example, obviously virtual material may include animated figures or sketches that
clearly indicate that no real person is depicted therein.
13. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
14. See Second Life, Terms of Service, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php [hereinafter
Terms of Service] (requiring members to be eighteen years of age or older to register for Second
Life).
15. As discussed infra Part II.B.3, the law may only regulate virtual child pornography if it
is "indistinguishable from" real child pornography.
16. See FAQ, supra note 1. Such conduct constitutes a violation of Second Life's policies
and subjects the user to possible In-world consequences, such as account cancellation. See id.
17. Cf Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002) ("These images do not
involve, let alone harm, any children in the production process.").
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contained in Second Life. This section uncovers the unique features of the
virtual "Residents," the rules and policies binding them, and the potential
overlap between real life and Second Life. Part IV analyzes relevant child
pornography law. In particular, it addresses three distinct categories of
alleged crimes involving virtual child pornography that may occur in
Second Life. Part V argues that the unsupported possibility of harm to real
children and the intangible harm to virtual children do not justify the
prosecution of virtual child pornography in Second Life. This Comment
concludes that because no harm befalls a real child, virtual child
pornography lies outside the child pornography exception and thus, should
retain First Amendment protection.
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment rests upon a simple tenet-speech is inherently
valuable. As Justice Brennan eloquently expressed, "[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable."' 8  Still, when speech promotes certain
types of harm, the government has found that the subsequent harm
outweighs the value of free speech. 19 To date, the Supreme Court and the
legislature have consistently recognized several categories of speech that
do not warrant First Amendment protection.2°
A. Speech Not Protected by the First Amendment
1. Impending Violence Exceptions
The First Amendment does not protect speech which is likely to
provoke violent behavior. 21 The Court recognizes three such categories:
(1) incitement; (2) fighting words; and (3) true threats.22 Incitement occurs
when an individual intends his or her words to produce imminent unlawful
18. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
19. See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (noting that
the government may regulate speech to promote a compelling interest, such as protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors).
20. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) (stating that there is no
mandatory rule prohibiting all governmental regulation on speech).
21. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that so-called
"fighting words," which are personally abusive epithets likely to provoke violent reaction, can be
banned).
22. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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action by another and such words are likely to cause unlawful action. 3
Fighting words are used in face-to-face confrontations that may, but need
not, induce an immediate retaliation against the speaker.24 True threats
include words intended to place and actually do place recipients in
reasonable fear that violence or force will be used against them.25 Because
these categories of speech do not invite counter-speech, but rather counter-
violence by increasing the likelihood the recipient will respond violently in
defense,26 they lack value and fall outside the scope of First Amendment
protection.
2. Pornography Exceptions
Since its creation, pornography has bred much controversy.27 The
earliest traceable pornographic film was reportedly shown in 1897.28 The
market for pornography has since flourished, earning up to thirteen billion
dollars per year.29 Seemingly, this vast figure suggests that a substantial
number of Americans produce, advertise, endorse, promote, or view
pornography. Nonetheless, while many Americans are involved in the
pornography business (perhaps secretly or shamefully), the general public
historically has viewed the industry as disgusting and offensive.
Accordingly, American society as a whole has attempted to regulate
the pornography industry. 30  For decades, however, First Amendment
obstacles prevented the Court from promulgating a standard by which
pornography could be clearly recognized and identified. Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart notoriously summed up the Court's frustration with
this elusive definition by remarking that, at best, pornography is such that
23. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
24. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (noting while retaliation need not actually occur for a
court to find a proscribable fighting word, the exception only applies when the potential harm
(reaction to the words) would be immediate and probable-it is the immediacy and likelihood
that underlie this exception and others).
25. See Virginia, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
26. Kyle Duncan, Prosecution Responses to Internet Victimization: Child Pornography and
First Amendment Standards, 76 MISS. L.J. 677, 681 (2007).
27. Ken Mondschein, History of Single Life: Dirty Movies and You, NERVE, Aug. 23,
2008, http://www.nerve.com/regulars/singlelife/history-of-single-life-dirty-movies-and-you.
28. Filmsite: Sexual or Erotic Films, http://www.filmsite.org/sexualfilms.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2009).
29. Family Safe Media: Pornographic Statistics,
http://www.familysafemedia.com/pornography-statistics.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009)
(illustrating the separate aspects of the pornography industry and its relative revenues as recently
as 2006).
30. Mondschein, supra note 27.
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you "know it when [you] see it."''3  Throughout the late 1950s and early
1960s, the Court simply could not reach a majority standard that defined
what kind of pornography was "too hard core for people to see or read.
3 2
For many years, the Court avoided defining the criteria for "too hard
core."33  Instead, it applied subjective notions of offensive material,34
justifying certain exclusions on the basis that the morals of society widely
35embraced its decisions. Not until 1973 did the Court finally articulate a
standard by which it could restrict pornographic material.36
a. Obscene Pornography
In 1973, the Court in Miller v. California held that the First
Amendment did not protect obscene material.37 The Court set forth a three-
part test for obscenity: (1) whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (3) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 38  Beyond
articulating a definition for obscenity, the Court provided various examples
of sexually explicit conduct that would qualify as "patently offensive"
under its definition.39  By furnishing a colorful, albeit graphic, list of
activities that would escape First Amendment protection, the Miller Court
seemingly suggested that only "hard core" pornography fell within the
definition of obscenity. 40  As such, the Court later clarified that nudity
alone did not satisfy Miller's obscenity standard.4'
31. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
32. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
33. Id.; see also Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 482-83
(1957).
34. See, e.g., Redrup, 386 U.S. at 770-71.
35. See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 482-83 (explaining that at the time of the Constitution's
ratification, certain speech, including libel and blasphemy, was not afforded absolute First
Amendment protection in many states).
36. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
37. Id. at 36-37.
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id. at 25.
40. See id.
41. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
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Furthermore, the Miller Court acknowledged in dicta that differing
community standards could lead to different results between jurisdictions
regarding obscenity laws.42 Chief Justice Warren Burger noted that the
First Amendment does not require "the people of Maine or Mississippi [to]
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New
York City. ' 43 One year later in Hamling v. United States, the Court held
that neither state nor national standards would determine whether material
was "patently offensive" or appealed to the "prurient interest" of an
individual.44
Because the First Amendment ideally operates to protect speech
regardless of what it expresses, the Miller Court needed to provide an
overriding state interest that superseded the right to freedom of speech and
expression.45 To that end, the Court identified society's interest to avoid
offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients and to prevent exposure
to minors.46 Additionally, in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, decided that
same day, the Court recognized a further public interest in "the quality of
life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the
great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself. 4 7 There, the
Court appeared to suggest that the mass production, advertisement, and sale
of pornography negatively affects the nation as a whole. Accordingly, the
Court concluded that withdrawal of First Amendment protection over
obscene material was morally and rationally justified.48
b. Child Pornography
In 1982, the Court recognized another category of speech that the
First Amendment does not protect-child pornography.49 In New York v.
Ferber, the Court upheld a New York statute that criminalized the
"promotion" of sexual activity by a child under the age of sixteen.5" In
doing so, the Court held that states could ban visual depictions of children
engaged in sexual activity, even when the material did not meet the
42. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 31-34 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
43. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
44. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974).
45. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
46. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969).
47. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973).
48. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567; Slaton, 413 U.S. at 57-58.
49. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
50. See id. at 751.
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obscenity standard set forth in Miller.5  Believing the prohibition of child
pornography secured a "conceptually different" interest than that of the
prohibition of obscene material, the Court categorized child pornography as
its own distinct First Amendment exception.5 2 Importantly, although the
Court distinguished obscenity from child pornography, it also viewed the
latter as a subset of the former.53 Indeed, child pornography is often
sufficient to meet the Miller standard of its own accord because promotion
of child pornography is widely held to be an obscene practice.54 In effect,
when child pornography law is insufficient to penalize a child
pornographer, the government may turn to obscenity law as an
alternative.55
Justifying the exclusion of child pornography from First Amendment
protection, the Ferber Court articulated the "surpassing[ly] importan[t]"
public interest in preventing the sexual exploitation of minors in the
production of the material.56 Specifically, it identified four reasons why
child pornography could be regulated.57 First, the state has a compelling
interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well being of a
minor. ' '58  Second, shutting down the pornography distribution network
protects children in two ways: 59 (1) it prevents the exacerbated harm to the
depicted children caused by ongoing circulation of the "permanent record
of the children's participation"; 60 and (2) by "drying up the market" for
pornography, fewer children participate in its production, 61 resulting in less
exploitation of children. 62 The third underlying rationale supporting this
exemption is the government's increased ability to prosecute the advertisers
and distributors of the material, most of which are "integral" to the
51. See generally id. at 751 (explaining how Miller's standard is not a satisfactory solution
to the child pornography problem because the state has a particular and more compelling interest
in protecting children from sexual exploitation).
52. See Duncan, supra note 26, at 684.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 684.
56. 458 U.S. at 757.
57. Id. at 756-63.
58. Id. at 756 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
59. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 759-60.
62. The Court even held, in a later case, that the state could proscribe the mere private
viewing and possession of child pornography as unlawful, noting that such a law could
effectively "destroy a market for the exploitative use of children." Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 109 n.4 (1990).
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"production of such materials. 63 Finally, the Court stated there was little,
if any, serious educational, scientific, or literary value from the depictions
of children involved in lewd conduct.64 Recognized in later cases, any
alleged value that results from such material can be achieved through the
use of "youthful looking" adults.65
Ferber's child pornography exception is broader than Miller's
obscenity exception. Under Ferber, the material need not appeal to the
prurient interest of the average person to qualify as child pornography, nor
does the sexual conduct need to be portrayed in a "patently offensive"
manner.66  Additionally, unlike material analyzed under the Miller test,
under Ferber, the work will not be evaluated as a whole, thereby vastly
diminishing the instances where the Court might find value in the
material.67 Still, Ferber recognized that child pornography laws, like
obscenity laws, also run the risk of being overbroad, 68 heavily restrictive,
and may suppress too much protected speech.69 In recognition of the
powerful interests stated above, the Court deferred to the states' legislatures
in regulating child pornographic material more than it deferred to states in
regulating obscenity.7°
3. The Remaining Exceptions
Finally, there are four other categories of speech the Court will not
protect under the First Amendment. 71 These include defamation, perjury,
blackmail, and solicitation to commit crimes.72 Although the specific
rationale supporting each category differs, these exceptions share one
common feature-they reflect the Court's judgment that the need to
63. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62.
64. Id. at 762-63.
65. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
66. 458 U.S. at 764.
67. Id.
68. Overbreadth refers to the doctrine that a law is unconstitutional if, in the course of
proscribing unprotected speech, it suppresses a substantial amount of speech otherwise protected
by the Constitution. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
69. 458 U.S. at 756.
70. Id.
71. There are other categories of speech that receive less protection under the First
Amendment, such as commercial speech and indecent broadcasts, but these are outside the scope
of this Comment.
72. See First Amendment Center, Exceptions to First Amendment,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary/libraryexpression.aspx?topic=exceptions (last
visited Jan. 29, 2009).
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regulate such speech outweighs the expressions' value.73 Adhering to the
constitutional limits on judicial power, the Court refrains from regulating
the content of constitutionally protected speech unless the government
demonstrates that the regulation is necessary to promote a "compelling
interest" and the government "chooses the least restrictive means to further
the articulated interest., 74 In effect, the First Amendment "presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection. 75
Therefore, the state may regulate speech only when it rises to the level of
harmful conduct that requires public protection over freedom of
expression.76
B. Child Pornography: Tension Between Congress and the Court
1. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
Ferber remained the prevailing federal law regulating child
pornography until Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996 (CPPA).77 Specifically, the legislature was concerned with
technological developments on the Internet, which made it increasingly
difficult to determine whether certain computer images depicted actual or
virtual children. 78 A virtual child can take shape in many different ways.
For instance, a virtual child may be a wholly computer-generated image
that does not involve an actual child, though it may look indistinguishable
from one.79 On the other hand, a photograph or video may depict a real
child that is computer-morphed into certain positions or movements, which
the actual child did not perform.80 A picture of a virtual child may even
contain the head of an actual child plastered onto the body of another
73. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (exemplifying the
defamation exception).
74. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
75. Assoc'd Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Assoc'd Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D. 1943)).
76. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941) (displaying an
instance where the Court balanced the level of harmful conduct).
77. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
78. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(5), 117 Stat. 650, 676 (2003) [hereinafter PROTECT Act of
2003].
79. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 114-117.
80. See generally § 501(4), 117 Stat. at 676 (describing how technology now allows users to
manipulate photographs in various ways).
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(virtual or actual, adult or minor), or vice versa. 8 1 Due to the variety of
situations that enabled child pornographers to slip past Ferber and evade
prosecution, Congress sought to expand existing federal law to take into
account evolving technology.82 Through the CPPA, Congress sought to
punish the production, promotion, and distribution of all apparently
realistic pornographic depictions of children: actual, virtual, or any
combination thereof.
83
Similar to Ferber, the CPPA banned child pornography that used
actual children.84 Moreover, the CPPA extended the Ferber rule by further
prohibiting pornography that involved "any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer-generated image or picture,
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of
sexually explicit conduct, . . . [that] is, or appears to be, of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 85  Theoretically, this expansive
definition of child pornography included not only digital depictions of
simulated children, but also depictions of sexual activity between adult
actors who looked "youthful. 86 However, the CPPA did more than merely
prohibit the existence of such material.87 The law banned any sexually
explicit material that "is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is
or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct., 88  This anti-pandering provision, taken with the expanded
definition of child pornography, effectively proscribed material that never
involved an actual minor.89 Therefore, as long as the material suggested
that a minor was sexually depicted therein, the material lost its First
Amendment protection.9"
81. See generally id.
82. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002) (referring to one
congressional finding that "[a]s imaging technology improves,.... it becomes more difficult to
prove that a particular picture was produced using actual children").
83. § 501(13)-(14), 117 Stat. at 678; see also infra Part II.B.3.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2000).
85. Id. § 2256(8)(B), amended by § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
86. Asheroft, 535 U.S. at 270 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 104-358, at
21 (1996)).
87. See § 2256(8)(D) (repealed 2003).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. See generally PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(4), 117 Stat. 650, 678.
90. See id. at 679.
YOU ONLY LIVE TWICE
2. Ashcrofi v. Free Speech Coalition
In a somewhat controversial opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the
Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition held that the CPPA was
unconstitutional insofar as it proscribed material that never involved actual
children. 91  While the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits upheld the
CPPA, the Ninth Circuit struck down the "appears to be" and "conveys the
impression" provisions, declaring them to be unconstitutionally
overbroad.92 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.9 3 Decided in 2002,
the Ashcroft Court held that a ban on pornographic material could only
survive if the material was obscene under Miller or involved actual children
under Ferber.94  The Court found that the unique interests justifying
Ferber's decision did not extend to the prohibition of material where no
children were harmed in its production.95 Where the "speech ... itself is
the record of sexual abuse," the Asheroft Court could not find like harm in
the production of material that never involved a child.96 The Court noted
that, under the CPPA, the government may prosecute the producers and
possessors of valuable material that derives its worth from the very fact that
the actors look youthful. 97  The Court argued that Academy Award-
winning films such as Traffic and American Beauty would be criminalized
under the CPPA, as would films exploring teen romances (e.g., Romeo +
Juliet).9 8 The CPPA could even ban psychological manuals used to instruct
teenagers on sexual education, or films reporting the effects of sexual
abuse.99
Based on legislative findings supporting the CPPA, the government
tried, but failed, to keep the CPPA afloat with three distinct arguments.
00
First, it argued that the depiction of child-like images still whets
pedophiles' appetites, availing them of material that "encourages them to
engage in illegal conduct."10' 1 The Court rejected this argument on the
ground that "[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is
91. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
92. Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 68.
93. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
94. See id. at 256.
95. See id. at 250-51.
96. Id. at 250.
97. See id. at 246-47 (noting teenage sexual activity has inspired countless literary works,
including William Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet).
98. Id. at 247-48.
99. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246.
100. See id. at 253-55.
101. Id. at 253.
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not a sufficient reason for banning it."' 0 2 Second, the Court rejected the
government's unsupported assumption that since virtual and actual
pornography may be indistinguishable, the two belong to the same market
and should be regulated together. 10 3 The Court noted that if the two were
nearly identical, then the "illegal images would be driven from the market
by the indistinguishable substitutes," as no one would risk prosecution for
actual child pornography if its computerized substitute sufficed. 10 4 Finally,
the Court rejected the government's argument that since virtual
pornography is often indistinguishable from actual pornography,
prosecution under Ferber would become increasingly difficult if experts
could not determine whether the material portrayed real children or
computer-generated images. 0 5  The Court rationalized its holding by
referring to the overbreadth doctrine, which forbids the legislature or the
Court from banning unprotected speech when "a substantial amount of
protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.' 0 6
Though its decision centered on the "appears to be" provision of the
CPPA, the Court also invalidated the "conveys the impression"
provision. °7 The Court concluded that, if enforced, this provision would
have submitted any possessor of "pandered" material to prosecution,
regardless of its source. 0 8 The Court found that the provision prohibited
the possession by a subsequent purchaser if the material was earlier
pandered as child pornography. 09 Again, the Court found the provision to
be substantially overbroad. 10  In sum, Ashcroft remedied the likely
consequences of both overbroad provisions of the CPPA, noting that the
statute as a whole "proscribe[d] a significant universe of speech""'
otherwise protected by the First Amendment.
102. Id.; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (explaining that
exceptions to the First Amendment require more than a tendency to result in harm, but
probability).
103. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 254-55.
106. Id. at 255; see supra note 68.
107. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 257-58.
108. Duncan, supra note 26, at 690.
109. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 240.
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3. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act
By invalidating the CPPA, Ashcroft forced Congress to try again.
Congressional findings demonstrated that because Miller and Ferber failed
to sufficiently address the child pornography problem, given recent
developments in technology, "prosecutors have been hindered by not
having all the tools needed to prosecute criminals who create child
pornography."'1 2  As a result, Congress responded by passing the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT). 1 3 In support of PROTECT,
Congress revealed new findings." 14 It found that "no substantial evidence"
existed to suggest that "child pornography images being trafficked today
were made other than by the abuse of real children."'"15 Congress also
found that, with the aid of current technology (as it existed in 2003), people
could disguise images of actual children so as to make them "unidentifiable
and to make depictions of real children appear computer-generated."
'"16
New technology could even generate realistic images of children over the
computer. 117
Based on these findings, Congress amended the CPPA "appears to
be" provision to ban "any visual depiction ... where.., such visual
depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image
that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct."' 1 8 The amended provision limited the ban to digital,
computerized, or computer-generated images, thereby effectively
addressing Ashcroft's concern that valuable films such as Traffic and
Romeo + Juliet would not fall within its ban." 9 Furthermore, by replacing
the "appears to be" language in the statute with the words
"indistinguishable from," Congress remedied the problem that "drawings,
cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults" could fall
112. YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, 118 (Ashgate 2008) (quoting President George W. Bush as he
signed PROTECT into law on April 30, 2003).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000 & Supp. III 2003); § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. 2003).
114. See PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501, 117 Stat. 650, 676 (2003)
(describing how technology now creates ways to alter photographs in a variety of ways).
115. Id. § 501(7), 117 Stat. at 677.
116. Id. § 501(5), 117 Stat. at 676.
117. Id.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (emphasis added).
119. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 60 (2003).
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within the definition of proscribed material. 20  Under PROTECT,
Congress defined "indistinguishable" as depictions that were "virtually
indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such that an ordinary person
viewing the depiction would conclude that the depiction is of an actual
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct."'
121
Furthermore, Congress passed a new anti-pandering provision to
replace the CPPA's "conveys the impression" provision that the Court
struck down in Ashcroft.122 This provision punishes anyone who
knowingly, advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or
solicits ... any material or purported material in a manner that
reflects the belief or that is intended to cause another to believe,
that the material or purported material is, or contains: (i) an
obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 1
23
The implications of this provision are critical-no actual pornography
(obscene, child, or otherwise) needs to exist for prosecution under this
section. 124 Under this provision, there are two things the solicitor cannot
do. First, the solicitor cannot specifically intend to cause recipients to
believe they will receive actual child, or obscene, pornography. 25 Second,
the solicitor cannot solicit what he or she believes is actual child, or
obscene, pornography. 126 President Bush signed PROTECT into law on
April 30, 2003,127 and it remained the unchallenged law governing child
pornography until 2006.128
4. United States v. Williams
In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit decided a case involving a defendant
who attempted to use a public chat room to exchange actual child
pornography with someone he believed to be a child, but was in fact a
120. § 2256(11) (Supp. 2003).
121. Id.; see generally § 501(5), 117 Stat. at 676 (amending the definition of
"indistinguishable").
122. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2003).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 61-62.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally Akdeniz, supra note 112 (detailing the history of PROTECT and the
President's statement made when signing the bill into law).
128. PROTECT contains further provisions that do not implicate the First Amendment and
are therefore not discussed in this Comment.
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Secret Service agent.1 29 In United States v. Williams, the defendant posted
a message stating that he had sexual pictures of himself, and other men,
engaging in sexual acts with his four-year-old daughter and would swap
them for other "toddler pics, or live cam."'' 30 Posing as a child, the agent
gained the defendant's trust and subsequently received seven pictures
featuring "actual children, aged approximately 5 to 15, engag[ed] in
sexually explicit conduct and displaying their genitals."' 3' After obtaining
a search warrant for the defendant's home, agents discovered over twenty
images of actual "children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.'
' 32
Following his conviction for possession of child pornography and
pandering under PROTECT, 133 the district court sentenced the defendant to
concurrent five-year sentences, rejecting his constitutional challenge of the
anti-pandering provision. 134
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit struck down the provision as
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. 135 In doing so, the court remained
sensitive to the dangers of child pornography in an age where child
pornographers can better evade detection through the use of the Internet
and enhanced computer graphics.' 36 In addition to the immediate abuse
involved in the production of actual child pornography, the court
recognized an additional harm-children also suffer from "the fact that
mainstream and otherwise innocuous images of children are viewed and
traded by pedophiles as sexually stimulating. ,137
Notwithstanding these concerns, the court was equally cognizant of
the long recognized (and often cited) constitutional harms that would result
from the enforcement of a law that prohibits a substantial amount of free
speech. 38  By divorcing the pandering speech from the nature of the
pandered material, the provision criminalized speech that solicits illegal
material (i.e., actual child pornography) even when the material itself was
129. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11 th Cir. 2006).
130. Id.
131. United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1837 (2008).
132. Id. at 1837-38.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2003).
134. Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1838 (explaining that the defendant was charged with further
criminal violations, but the additional charges are not relevant for the purposes of this Comment).
135. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1309 (stating that overbreadth addresses First Amendment
concerns while vagueness addresses Due Process concerns under the Fifth Amendment).
136. See id. at 1290 (noting how technological advantages have resulted in proliferation of
child pornography on the Internet).
137. Id.
138. See supra note 68.
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either legal or non-existent. 139 The incongruity between the underlying
material and the speech that solicited it resulted in the criminalization of
speech that merely advocated fantasies, but not actual illegal conduct.
140
This, the court indicated, would violate the First Amendment, unless it fell
within the incitement exception under Brandenburg or other excluded
categories. 14  For these reasons, the court struck down the provision for
violating the First Amendment, urging Congress to try again. 
1
42
In 2008, the Supreme Court agreed to review the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion. 143 In United States v. Williams, the Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit decision and upheld PROTECT. 44 In doing so, the Court held that
a solicitor may not attempt to persuade a potential recipient that the
solicitor has child pornography and is willing to make it available to the
recipient, even when such material does not exist. 145  Distinguishing
Williams from Ashcroft, the Court recognized that PROTECT did not
require the existence of actual child pornography, as did the CPPA, which
was held invalid in Ashcroft. 146 The Court made it clear that PROTECT's
anti-pandering provision did not target the underlying material, but rather
the "collateral speech that introduce[d] such material into the child-
pornography distribution network.' ' 147 The Court recognized three critical
features of the provision. 48  First, "knowledge" was the level of intent
required for every element of PROTECT. 149  Second, the language in
PROTECT directed toward "advertis[ing], promot[ing], present[ing],
distribut[ing], or solicit[ing]" suggests that speech is proscribable only
when it is used to induce a commercial or non-commercial transfer of
actual or virtual child pornography. 150  Lastly, Congress essentially used
the same definition for "sexually explicit conduct" in PROTECT's anti-
pandering provision as was used in the definition of "sexual conduct" in the
139. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1298.
140. See id. at 1300 ("However repugnant we may find them, we may not constitutionally
suppress a defendant's belief that simulated depictions of children are real or that innocent
depictions of children are salacious.").
141. Id. at 1298; see also supra Part II.A.
142. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1309.
143. United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008).
144. Id. at 1847.
145. Id. at 1838.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1838-39.
148. Id. at 1839. The Court actually points out five significant features, but the three that
address the First Amendment issue are the only ones relevant for the purposes of this Comment.
149. Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1839.
150. Id. at 1839-40.
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New York statute upheld in Ferber that first criminalized non-obscene
child pornography. 151
In the throes of twisted logic, the Williams Court rejected the
Eleventh Circuit's rationale that the anti-pandering provision is
unconstitutional because it punishes the speech of a "braggart, exaggerator,
or outright liar. 1 52 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia asserted that, if
anything, such speech is "doubly excluded from First Amendment
protection."'' 53 Offering child pornography is not only an offer to provide
illegal products, regardless of whether such products exist, but it is also
fraudulent. 54 Under this logic, a solicitor of child pornography is more
protected if that solicitor actually has such material because the solicitation
would not be fraudulent. 55  Nonetheless, Justice Scalia defended
PROTECT in the face of the dissent's astute observation-that Congress
circumvented the First Amendment protection of virtual child pornography
by "prohibiting proposals to transact in such images rather than prohibiting
the images themselves,"' 5 6 thereby overruling Ferber and Ashcroft.157 The
majority defended its position by stating that even when child pornography
is virtual, the proscribable feature is the fact that the solicitor knowingly
intends to persuade the solicitee to believe it features real children.
58
Accordingly, Williams upheld PROTECT's anti-pandering provision.
However, neither Williams nor any other federal or state appellate courts
have yet addressed whether the "indistinguishable from" amendment to the
CPPA is constitutional under the First Amendment. 59 Therefore, current
law still protects a virtual image that portrays non-realistic depictions of
children engaged in sexual activity.
151. Id. at 1840.
152. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1298 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
153. Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1842.
154. See, e.g., id. (citing Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S.
600, 611-12 (2003), which allowed the government to ban "both fraudulent offers and ... offers
to provide illegal products").
155. Such would be the implication of Justice Scalia's reasoning. See Williams, 128 S. Ct.
at 1842.
156. Id. at 1844 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 1854 (Souter, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 1844 (majority opinion).
159. Duncan, supra note 26, at 700; see also PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §
501(5), 117 Stat. 650, 676 (2003).
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III. WHAT IS SECOND LIFE?
As if managing one life is not challenging enough, now individuals
can balance two. In 2003, Linden Lab, a privately held company, created
an Internet phenomenon that opened up a whole new world of social
networking.1 60 Aptly dubbed Second Life, this virtual reality takes "living"
to a whole new level-it provides a metaversel 6 1 in which users interact
through a first person perspective.' 62 To participate in Second Life, users
create an avatar, which is a virtual person (called a "Resident") that lives in
Second Life. 163 When they are In-world, users of Second Life, also known
as "controllers," interact through their avatars.164 These Residents live,
communicate, and transact business much like people do in the real
world.165 They may engage in a variety of activities, including (but not
limited to) joining recreational groups, establishing careers, dating,1 66 and
even purchasing and selling land. 67 However, Second Life is not without
its virtual quirks, which make a Second Life uniquely preferable to a real
life.
A. Critical Features of Second Life
To become a Resident, new users create an avatar, to which they
assign any number of characteristics.' 68 The user picks the gender, age, and
160. Philip Rosedale formed Linden Lab in 1999 and launched Second Life on June 23,
2003. Press Release, Linden Lab, Your Second Life Begins Today (June, 23 2003), available at
http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/03_0623.
161. See NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 22 (1992) (coining the term "metaverse" to
mean a virtual world where humans interact through avatars in a three-dimensional environment
that simulates the real world).
162. Press Release, Linden Lab, Linden Lab Announces Name of New Online World
'Second LifeTM' and Availability of Beta Program (Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Linden Lab
Announces Name], available at http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/02_ 10_30; see generally
Second Life, http://secondlife.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
163. Linden Lab Announces Name, supra note 162; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/avatar (last visited Oct. 26, 2008) (defining "avatar"
as an "electronic image that represents and is manipulated by a computer user (as in a computer
game)").
164. Linden Lab Announces Name, supra note 162.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Second Life Affair Ends in Divorce,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/l 1/1 4/second.life.divorce/index.html (last visited
Mar. 27, 2009) (discussing how people meet their real-life spouses in Second Life and treat
virtual affairs with other avatars as cheating).
167. Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 89.
168. Id.
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physical features of his or her avatar. 69 The avatar may be human, non-
human, fictional, or non-fictional.7 ° Once the user creates an avatar, the
avatar resides in Second Life and may, currency-permitting, buy land to
build a home or business.1 71 The Resident is then free to explore Second
Life, interacting with other Residents and conducting whatever business in
the "marketplace" it desires. Unlike other virtual realities, Second Life is
not a game with an objective. 172 Its purpose is merely to enjoy an alternate
lifestyle and to experience a life beyond the parameters of the real world. 
173
The laws of physics are not strictly applied in Second Life. 74 Avatars
typically travel on foot or in motor vehicles, but they can also fly (without
airplanes) or teleport to their next location.7 5 Second Life's appeal largely
lies in its ability to provide a fantasy world, free from earthly restrictions
where users enjoy experiences beyond the realm of physical possibility in
real life. 176  Along these lines, Residents are not bound by the usual
limitations of a legal justice system. There is no Second Congress, Second
Court, or Second police. Consequently, avatars often engage in crimes
with impunity-these can include tax evasion, robbery, prostitution, rape,
and, as relevant here, sex with children.
177
Nevertheless, although "the presence of sex as an aspect of creative
expression and playful behavior in a place like [Second Life] is healthy,"' 178
the creators of Second Life imposed some policies to prevent the sexually
deviant behavior that most worries the general public. 179 First, users must
be eighteen years of age to join.180 But facing the common difficulty with
adult websites and chat rooms, the Second Life creators have no practical
169. Id.
170. Id. Avatars can take any shape, including talking animals, mythological creatures, or
even pieces of furniture. See id.
171. Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Opens the Lindex Currency Exchange (Oct. 3,
2005) [hereinafter Second Life Opens], available at
http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/10_03-05; see also infra note 189.
172. See Kristen Kalning, If Second Life Isn't a Game, What Is It?, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 12,
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17538999/.
173. See id. (attempting to classify Second Life's genre of entertainment).
174. Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 89.
175. Id. (stating that avatars can teleport to various locations).
176. See, e.g., Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185, 193
(2004).
177. See generally Meek-Prieto, supra note 10.
178. Mitch Wagner, Sex in Second Life, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 26, 2007, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/hosted/showArticle.jhtmlarticlelD= 199701944
(quoting founder and CEO of Linden Lab, Philip Rosedale).
179. Terms of Service, supra note 14.
180. Id.
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means to enforce this policy. Thus, the creators can do little to guarantee
all users are age appropriate. 18 Secondly, the creators of Second Life
responded to the rape and sexual abuse of child avatars occurring In-
world 182 by implementing a new policy forbidding "sexual age-play.'
' 83
The policy even prevents a child avatar from representing that its controller
is less than eighteen years of age.1 84 Further, the policy bans solicitation of
any child pornography-both virtual pornography solicited for In-world
use and actual pornography solicited for real-world use.185 These policies
are Abuse Reportable; when violated, Second Life will cancel the
offending user's account,' 86 thus ending his or her residency in Second
Life. Under current American law, however, these virtual "crimes" are not
punishable and will not result in real-world convictions.' 87
B. Intersection of Second Life and First Life
For the most part, Second Lives are just that-users explore their
Second Lives while maintaining separate first lives. However, both
corruption and ambition may blur the line between Second Life and the real
world when In-world conduct causes real-world consequences. 88  For
example, money earned In-world may be converted into real-world
money.' 89  Second Life even boasts of its own "virtual Donald Trump,"
whose estimated worth is over one million U.S. dollars in Linden-earned
profits from real estate ventures.' 90 Additionally, Second Life ensures that
181. See id.
182. See generally Alan Sipress, Does Virtual Reality Need a Sheriff?, WASH. POST, June 2,
2007, at A 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/01/AR20070 60102671 .html (discussing investigations in Belgium
and Germany where virtual crimes were committed In-world).
183. "Sexual age-play" is when a child avatar, controlled by an adult, engages in sexual
activity with another avatar. See Posting of Kend Linden to Linden Lab Blog,
http://blog.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/authors/Kend.Linden (Nov. 14, 2007).
184. Terms of Service, supra note 14
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. But see Sipress, supra note 182 (noting that under some foreign laws, such as German
law, such conduct "could run afoul of [] laws against child pornography").
188. See generally id.
189. To earn real world money, a user must have initially converted U.S. currency into
Linden Dollars (L$), allowing the Resident to use the Linden currency to transact business In-
world. As in real life, such business transactions may result in profitable ventures. The user may
then convert the L$ back into U.S. dollars, and "cash in" from activities conducted In-world. See
Second Life Opens, supra note 171.
190. Some users have dedicated their real-world lives to the pursuit of Linden-turned-U.S.
profits, quitting their real jobs and "working" In-world. See generally Bettina M. Chin, Note,
Regulating Your Second Life: Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72:4 BROOK. L. REv. 1303, 1305-
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users retain all intellectual property rights to their creations.1 91 As such,
any virtual thefts of intellectual property occurring In-world may be
litigated in real-world courts and may subject the thieving avatar's
controller to real-world penalties.'
1 92
Avatars who commit In-world crimes such as rape or sexual child
abuse, however, will not similarly face real-world consequences.
193
Whereas real-world property rights may be damaged if such rights are
violated In-world, real-world personal safety is not likewise endangered
when an avatar is subjected to violence or rape. 194 While "[p]eople have a
[real-world] interest in... the integrity of their person,.., in virtual
reality, these interests are not tangible but [are] built from intangible data
and software."' 95 Accordingly, courts in the United States do not currently
prosecute In-world "criminal" behavior.' 96 However, advocates for real-
world punishment for such In-world conduct suggest that a victim of cyber
rape still suffers, albeit in a different way than a victim of real-world
rape. 197 They even argue that the sexual depiction of virtual children harms
real children,1 9 even when the production of the images involves no real
children, and no real children ever view the images. Despite these
arguments, the potential harm a real child might suffer as a result of sexual
predation In-world is intangible. Such harm does not resemble, or rise to
the level of, the types of harm that have long since warranted exceptions to
First Amendment freedoms.
06 (2007) (referring to Alan Sipress, Where Real Money Meets Virtual Reality, the Jury is Still
Out, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2006, at AI, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/25/AR 2006122500635.html).
191. Terms of Service, supra note 14 (providing that any content created or "invented" by
an avatar belongs not only to the avatar In-world, but to its real-world user as well).
192. See Wikipedia, Second Life, Fraud and Intellectual Property Protection,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second Life#Fraud and IntellectualPropertyProtection (last
visited Mar. 27, 2009) (explaining the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the statute under which
a user can sue for violation of these rights).
193. See generally Sipress, supra note 182 (contrasting foreign laws and United States law).
194. See id.
195. Id. (quoting Gregory Lastowka, a law professor at the Rutgers School of Law in New
Jersey).
196. See generally id. (contrasting foreign laws and United States law).
197. See, e.g., Castranova, supra note 176, at 192.
198. E.g., Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 105.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Second Life provides a forum for people to explore their fantasies.'
99
In a perfect Second world, Residents would pursue idealistic dreams
beyond the realm of real-world possibilities-fly across town, marry their
soul mates, establish rewarding careers, and even rewrite painful
childhoods. Unfortunately, the World, like the real world, is not without its
flaws. For every "good" Resident pursuing innocent dreams of enhanced
beauty, a "bad" Resident lives out a deviant fantasy that would be deemed
"criminal" if conducted in the real world.200 Avatars who choose to pursue
particular deviant fantasies, however, face potential exile from the
World.20 ' Despite this Second Life policy, In-world criminals are immune
from real-world prosecution 202 and, therefore, suffer no real-world
ramifications.
Modem social norms suggest that those who view and/or circulate
virtual child pornography should be subject to the same real-world
penalties as real child pornographers because both use images of children
as the subject of their arousal. While both In-world and real-world
pedophiles may be classified as deviants and immoral, it is far-reaching to
conclude the former is an equivalent offender to the latter. Indeed, First
Amendment jurisprudence is currently insufficient to proscribe virtual child
pornography as depicted in Second Life. For one, obscenity law does not
encompass it.2°3  Furthermore, in its present state, federal child
pornography law may not prohibit In-world conduct that merely emulates
real-world child pornographic material.20 4  Unlike real-world child
pornography, virtual child pornography in Second Life harms no real
children. Still, some argue that even though the production of such
material harms no actual child, its circulation does. 205  However, the
potential harm to real children arguably resulting from virtual child
pornography is too attenuated from the types of actual harm suffered by
real-world victims that justified the child pornography exception in New
199. See FAQ, supra note 1.
200. See Sipress, supra note 182.
201. Terms of Service, supra note 14; see also supra text accompanying notes 179-86.
202. E.g., Sipress, supra note 182 (explaining that virtual child abuse is not a crime in the
United States).
203. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also infra Part IV.A.
204. See supra Part II.B.
205. E.g., Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 105 (arguing that Second Life should be regulated
for virtual child pornography because it harms real children).
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York v. Ferber.20 6 No sufficient harm results from In-world "crimes" that
would justify exempting virtual child pornography from the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. Because proscribing child pornography In-world
would consequently chill otherwise protected speech, the Supreme Court
should not withdraw its protection over such In-world conduct.2 °7
Imagine the scenario where two adult users meet In-world through
their avatars, one an adult and the other a minor. Both avatars have sex and
walk away cyber-satisfied. °s Had this occurred in the real world, the adult
would, of course, be charged with statutory rape, regardless of whether the
minor consented. 20 9 When sexual activity occurs In-world, however, users
do not experience the physical sensation of sexual gratification. Rather,
what they experience is more analogous to the psychic gratification of
watching a pornographic film; any bodily pleasure they enjoy would have
to be self-induced. As a result, no real-world child is actually harmed.
Alternatively, in a similar scenario but where the child avatar does not
consent, any resulting "harm" would likewise be intangible. Here, the
"harm" would be analogous to the feeling of shock and disgust that is
provoked when watching a rape depicted on film. Prohibited from this
kind of age-play, 210 "criminal" avatars in the above situations would suffer
In-world consequences for their conduct regardless of the willingness of
the child avatar's adult controller.2 11 But should their controllers face real-
world consequences as well?
2 12
A. Obscene Under Miller?
Denying First Amendment protection to an In-world sexual deviant
requires an analysis of existing First Amendment law. If obscenity law
could successfully proscribe the aforementioned In-world speech,
prosecution would be straightforward. Courts could prosecute In-world
criminals without having to address the complex issues surrounding the
regulation of virtual child pornography. But for a court to conclude that the
depiction of adult-child avatar sex is obscene, it must meet the three-part
206. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1982).
207. Ashcrofl v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002); see also supra note 68.
208. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 178. Avatars, by default, have no genitalia. To "have
sex," avatars must purchase the necessary equipment to simulate sex as realistically as possible.
Id.
209. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2008).
210. See Catherine Neal, Children Avatars in Second Life, ASSOCIATED CONTENT, May 18,
2007, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/245698/childrenavatars in-second-life. html.
211. Terms of Service, supra note 14; see also supra text accompanying notes 179-86.
212. E.g., Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 102.
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test set forth in Miller v. California.21 3 Indeed, a prosecutor would have
great difficulty arguing that proscribing consensual avatar sex (regardless
of the avatar's age) between two adult users in the privacy of an In-world
home promotes either of the two rationales emphasized in Miller.214
1. Rationale One: Anyone Around to Offend?
There are few, if any, unwilling participants whom the state seeks to
avoid offending here. In the scenario described above, both users
consented and the only viewers of the pornographic depiction are the
willing users themselves. Still, some argue that virtual sexual activity is
not private even when conducted in a seemingly private locale In-world.1 5
Because users may access their Second Lives in a public location, such as a
coffee shop, unwilling viewers may be exposed to the pornographic images
of the avatars.21 6 However, given the predictability of certain conduct
resulting from simple human nature, this possibility (that some individuals
will be subjected to the material against their will) is more likely the
exception than the rule. Surely, most users prefer to conduct their Second
Lives in the privacy of their own homes, using their virtual lives to create
anonymous identities to live out their private fantasies. Indeed, the more
shameful the fantasy (e.g., sex with children), the more likely a user will
indulge it in private. In such a situation, the danger to "unwilling
participants" is minute. In line with the overbreadth doctrine, the law will
not ban speech if doing so will also ban a substantial amount of protected
speech.21 7
2. Rationale Two: Shielding Minors
Next, users must agree to the Terms of Service before starting a
Second Life.218 Once accepted, controllers on both ends are entitled to
213. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (setting forth the test as follows: (1)
whether "'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest"; (2) "whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law;" and (3) "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value").
214. See id. at 18-19; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
215. E.g., Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 103 (referring only to the situation where the
avatars and their respective controllers have virtual sex in the privacy of their virtual homes; it
would not apply when avatars have sex in public In-world).
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002); see also supra note
68.
218. Terms of Service, supra note 14. In fact, a user need only be thirteen years of age to
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assume that the other controller is of legal age. This is significant because
Miller sought to prevent exposure to minors; what goes on behind closed
Second doors remains private and thus, is not exposed to other avatars,
their users, or the general public (children or adults).219 Of course, though
the creators of Second Life do their best to prevent minors' access, the
Terms of Service220 do not ensure that all Residents are indeed at least
eighteen years of age. A child who sneaks onto Second Life might create
either an adult or child avatar, both of which still entitle users behind other
avatars to assume an adult controls it. In fact, any suggestion by an avatar
that its user is less than eighteen years of age violates the Terms of
Service. 221 Nevertheless, the very real possibility that children may sneak
onto Second Life suggests to some222 that the potential exposure to minors
justifies bringing real-world criminal charges against an unsuspecting user
whose avatar has sex with a child user's avatar.
But alas, consider the problem the following scenarios pose-
distinguish: (1) a child sneaks onto Second Life, creates a child avatar, and
has consensual sex with an adult avatar controlled by an adult; from (2) a
child sneaks onto Second Life, creates an adult avatar, and has consensual
sex with an adult avatar controlled by an adult. Some would argue that in
both situations the identical potential "harm" is present-namely, a real
child who witnesses his or her avatar having sex may become desensitized
to the psychological harm that such voyeuristic conduct causes.
223
Presumably, this is the sole harm applicable to minors that Miller sought to
prevent.224 If interpreted broadly, Miller would then prohibit consensual
sex between two adult avatars (as in the latter scenario) because of the
remote possibility that a child could sneak onto Second Life and
225misrepresent himself or herself as an adult. Yet, Second Life rightfully
treats the two situations differently. The former involves age-play and is
forbidden.226 The latter involves two adult avatars and presents a situation
that commonly arises during In-world dating. If Miller were applied to ban
all virtual dating because of the possibility that a child would sneak onto
participant in Second Life-however, those minors under age eighteen are restricted to a
designated "Teen Area." Id.
219. This is so because Second Lives are generally conducted in private. See discussion
supra Part IV.A. 1.
220. Terms of Service, supra note 14.
221. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 179-86.
222. See, e.g., Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 98-99.
223. See, e.g., id. at 105.
224. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973).
225. See id. at 24.
226. Terms of Service, supra note 14.
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Second Life and pose as an adult, obscenity law would be largely
impracticable. For example, the mere possibility that children could sneak
into R-rated movies, or sneak past the "Adult Section" tape in video stores,
or bypass the license agreements for adult websites, would require the
proscription of all such materials.
227
Accordingly, obscenity law under Miller is not concerned with what
goes on "behind the scenes" of the material.228 Rather, it addresses the
content of the material itself. Applying Miller, proscribing the material
requires that the image be so "hard core" as to escape First Amendment
protection.229 Regular consensual sex between avatars is not an obscene
depiction. 230 Therefore, a nearly identical image (where the only difference
is the substitution of a child avatar for an adult) is similarly not obscene
under Miller,23 provided that it would not, for other reasons, rise to the
level of obscenity. 232 To subject a user who engages in age-play to real-
world prosecution, then, requires an analysis of child pornography law as
established in 1982, which has since developed over the last three decades.
B. Second Child Pornographers and the First Amendment
Because Miller's obscenity definition cannot stretch to include a ban
on sexual activity involving virtual children in Second Life, the courts
would have to find that such "activities" constitute child pornography and
thus do not warrant First Amendment protection. Standing alone, Ferber
does not support the regulation or ban of such conduct in Second Life.233
Ferber's holding applies only when the production of child pornography
involves a real child.2 34 Therefore, a thorough analysis of current child
pornography law necessarily involves consideration of developments in
legislation and case law-specifically, those that involve Congress's
continuing efforts to assure that legislation keeps pace with recent
227. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002) (explaining that "[t]he
Government cannot ban speech fit for adults simply because it may fall into the hands of
children").
228. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (announcing the test used to determine whether material
can be regulated as obscene).
229. See id. at 25.
230. See, e.g., Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 102-03 (acknowledging that prevailing law
could not regulate virtual child pornography that involves only adults).
231. Of course, this assumes the image still only involves regular, consensual sexual activity
and does not depict anything verging on "hard core" as under the three-part Miller obscenity test.
232. Terms of Service, supra note 14.
233. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
234. See id. at 756-64 (discussing why children deserve special protection).
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advancements in technology. 5
Second Life might be used as a forum for three kinds of potentially
illegal conduct that may harm children: (1) the possession of child
pornography;236 (2) the sale of or the intent to sell child pornography;
237
and (3) the solicitation of real-world meetings.238 Each of these three
possibilities implicates different laws as to the manner of participation in,
and exploitation of, Second Life. This, in turn, requires separate analyses
to determine if the user who engages in such conduct justifiably warrants
any real-world consequences.
1. Possession of Virtual Child Pornography
a. The Law Now
In Second Life, "possession" of pornography may be inferred if a user
watches his or her avatar having sex with other avatars, just as any
pornographic viewing would be inferred. In turn, so long as one of the
avatars is a child, both users engaging in the viewing would seem to
"possess" virtual child pornography. Reducing child pornography law to
its essence, the present law simply does not proscribe the possession of
virtual child pornography that is not "indistinguishable from" real child
pornography.239 As child pornography appears in Second Life, Residents
cannot reasonably believe that an avatar resembles a real person so closely
that the avatar is "indistinguishable from" a real person. Indeed, given the
current state of available technology, no user can configure an avatar so
that it causes a reasonable viewer to believe that he or she is viewing a real
person in Second Life. Therefore, child pornography law in its current
form should not subject Second Life possessors of virtual child
pornography to real-world criminal penalties.24 °
235. The developments refer to the relevant cases and statutes discussed at length in Part II
of this Comment.
236. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (noting that unlike obscene
materials, possession of child pornography is criminalized).
237. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(3)(B) (2006).
238. For the purposes of this Comment, only two kinds of meetings are relevant: (1) a
meeting for the purpose of luring and seducing a child into sexual activity; and (2) a meeting
between fellow child pornographers to exchange pornography, or to swap techniques on methods
of child abuse.
239. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
240. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (holding that possession of
virtual child pornography is not illegal, thereby striking the Child Pornography Prevention Act's
definition of "child pornography" that Congress later corrected by substituting "indistinguishable
from" in place of "appears to be").
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A further problem arises in that the creation of pornographic images
in Second Life requires two users to actively engage in the virtual activity.
Because both participants arguably possess the images by virtue of having
created them jointly, this raises the question of whom the law should
punish in this situation: the adult-user/adult-avatar who seduces an adult-
user/child avatar or the adult-user/child-avatar who enjoys viewing images
of child-avatars having sex and thus seeks out other avatars with whom to
have sex? 241 Both examples involve only real-world adults and do not
harm real children. Still, some critics argue that despite current First
Amendment law to the contrary, the government should expand the child
pornography exception to include the type of virtual images appearing in
Second Life.242 For this argument to succeed, the legislature or the courts
would have to find that the potential harm resulting from virtual child
pornography is not only probable, but of a nature so great as to fall outside
the scope of First Amendment protection.243
b. Could the Law Constitutionally Be Broadened?
Made explicit in Ferber, the rationale behind exempting child
pornography from First Amendment protection lies largely in preventing
the sexual exploitation of actual children.244 The law not only subjects
those who produce child pornography to criminal penalties, but also those
who possess it.245 Recognizing that the production of child pornography
makes a permanent record of the sexual abuse the child experiences,
Ferber noted three distinct harms to children that justify the exemption.246
First, a child experiences immediate harm from the degradation,
exploitation, and sexual abuse resulting from the creation of the
pornography.247 Second, the circulation of the material further harms the
child by permanently documenting the abuse and damaging the child's
24reputation. 8 Finally, when a pedophile gains sexual pleasure from child
pornography, the market for such material grows, generating an even
greater demand for its production.249
241. Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 106.
242. See, e.g., id. at 91-92.
243. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982).
244. Id. at 757; see supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2006); see, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 106
(1990).
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When an alleged pedophile creates a computer-generated image
depicting children engaging in sexual activity, such as the hypothetical
scenarios described above, no children are harmed from the material's
production because real children are not involved. 250 Rather, as it is the
representation of a child that elicits sexual gratification in the viewer, the
production does not degrade, exploit, or abuse any real children.
25 1
Therefore, the first two harms articulated in Ferber are missing.252
Nevertheless, some may argue the possession of virtual child pornography
could harm children, implicating Ferber's third harm.253 The argument
would go as follows: Child pornographic material, real or virtual, promotes
real-world deviant behavior by whetting the appetites of pedophiles. 4
Thus, the material would increase the probability that a pedophile would
either be encouraged to abuse a real child directly or be motivated to seek
out real child pornography for more realistic images, thus fueling the
market for child pornography.255 Therefore, the possession of virtual child
pornography can eventually lead to sexual abuse of real children.
Accordingly, the law should treat virtual child pornography and real child
pornography similarly.
Notwithstanding Ashcroft's holding,256 the arguments that virtual
child pornography may increase the likelihood that pedophiles will sexually
abuse real children or that it may increase the demand for real child
pornography assume that those who view virtual child pornography are
like-minded with those who view real child pornography and/or abuse real
children.257 Indeed, studies show that possessors of real child pornography
are likely to be active child abusers. 258 Although most would agree that
viewing virtual child pornography is its own degenerate practice, the
Ashcroft Court, nevertheless, distinguishes between the materials found in
Ferber (where actual children were used) and virtual images, noting that
"[v]irtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically related' to the sexual abuse
of children. 259
250. Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 102-03.
251. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
252. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758-59.
253. See id.
254. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 (rejecting the government's argument that pedophiles will be
"encourage[d] ... to engage in illegal conduct"); see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
255. Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 107.
256. See 535 U.S. at 250 (recognizing that the causal link between virtual child pornography
and the sexual abuse of children is "contingent and indirect").
257. See id.
258. E.g., Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 107 n.84.
259. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250.
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Thus, there seemingly exists a notable difference between the
possessor of actual child pornography and the participant in virtual child
pornography. The former spends a significant amount of money procuring
a collection and risks prosecution under known child pornography law.
260
The latter, on the other hand, simply enters Second Life free of charge and
engages his or her avatar in sexual activity with a consenting user's child
avatar, under the reasonable belief that all avatar-operators are
contractually bound to be adults.26' Thus, while such behavior may still be
considered reprehensible, it does not exploit or injure any real child.
Because the law forbids real-world sexual conduct with minors,262 the user
can indulge in certain fantasies in a harmless environment in which
children are not involved. This virtual environment provides a forum for
potential deviants to explore their fantasies without causing actual harm to
anyone-arguably, a forum without which a deviant might take real-world
action to injure a real-world child. Thus, allowing those with pedophilic
fantasies to satisfy their curiosities in their Second Lives may actually
decrease, rather than increase, the likelihood that real children are
harmed.263 Consequently, leaving Second Life unregulated may result in
less harm to actual children, 264 particularly because there is no conclusive
proof that leaving Second Life unregulated would result in more harm to
real children.265
Furthermore, there is little to no evidence supporting the speculative
belief that virtual child pornography fuels the market for real child
pornography. Specifically in the context of Second Life, viewers or
possessors actively participate in their own gratification by controlling their
avatars' movements, as opposed to viewers who passively view
pornography on a screen or in a magazine. This suggests that rather than
purchasing pornography, the viewer's libido would be better served by
maintaining an active role and getting more virtual "play"-time.
Nevertheless, proponents of stricter regulation may argue that the
user's more active role increases the need for real-world penalties for the
possessor or creator of child pornographic material.266 Indeed, some argue
260. See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982).
261. Terms of Service, supra note 14.
262. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006).
263. See generally Wagner, supra note 178 (arguing that fulfilling sexual fantasies in
Second Life does not lead to the
need to fulfill those fantasies in real life).
264. See generally id.
265. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (rejecting the
argument there is causal link between virtual child pornography and the sexual abuse of children).
266. See id.
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that the users behind the avatars engaging in sexual behavior do more than
merely possess the pornographic images.267 Because the material's
existence depends upon the user's participation, the possessor also plays
the role of "producer," thereby doubling the justification for regulation.268
This argument, however, misconstrues the relationship between the
producer, possessor, and the harmed child. In the real world, producers
who make pornographic images (be it in films, magazines, books, etc.)
involving a child subject themselves to prosecution for directly exploiting
and abusing a child.269 In contrast, because mere possessors do not abuse
the child directly, the law punishes them less harshly.270 When applied in
the context of virtual settings such as Second Life, the possessor/producer
is even farther removed from the abused "child." In fact, the abused
"child" does not even exist. No real child is actually harmed by the image
production, 271 nor is a real child potentially harmed by an alleged increased
likelihood of child abuse or demand for real child pornography. Rather, the
victim of the "abuse" is merely a virtual child that neither feels physical
harm at the time of "production," nor is harmed by any subsequent
distribution. The only viewers of the In-world avatar-sex are the two users
themselves, or others who consent to viewing the images.272
Taken together, Ferber,273 Asherofi, and Williams consistently hold
that the possession of obviously virtual child pornography must retain First
Amendment protection.274 Moreover, despite the moral justifications that
some people argue warrant the expansion of child pornography law so that
it imposes criminal liability for the possession of material depicted in
Second Life, the Court's jurisprudence does not justify such an
expansion.275  Although users whose avatars (adult or child) engage in
virtual sex with child avatars may face exile from their Second Lives, their
conduct alone does not warrant the abandonment of constitutional
267. See Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 108.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 144 (1990) (noting arguments that the
states should not necessarily prohibit mere possession of child pornography).
271. See Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 108; see supra text accompanying notes 250-67.
272. "Nudity and sexual behavior is forbidden in Second Life outside of private areas and
sex clubs." Wagner, supra note 178.
273. Because Ferber was decided before developments in technology, the Court did not
address the issue of virtual child pornography.
274. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535
U.S. 234, 267 (2002); United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1308-09 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
275. See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234.
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protection in favor of real-world criminal penalties. 76
2. Pandering Child Pornography
Although Second Life's features extend beyond those of typical
277online social networks, it too can be used for the simple purpose of
communication. However, even when Residents use Second Life in this
basic way, Second Life's inherent nature sets it apart from other social
networks such as MySpace and Facebook. For one, Second Life users'
conduct differs from those logging into a chat room because Second Life
users do more than simply send and receive messages in text.278 Second
Life provides a method for users to not only "see" with whom they
communicate, but also allows them to more actively interact with others.
27 9
Second Life also differs in another important way from other online social
networks in that the use of an avatar-a unique aspect of participating in
Second Life-secures the user's anonymity.28° MySpace and Facebook, on
the other hand, generally facilitate communication between real-world
people using their real-world identities. 281 Thus, because of its exclusive
features, Second Life poses a unique problem-what law, if any, should
apply to regulate the conduct of a Second Life user who utilizes the World
to indulge deviant fantasies by pandering child pornography, real or
virtual?
a. Pandering Real Child Pornography
The first issue is whether a user may enter Second Life and solicit the
transfer of real child pornography in the real world. Applying the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003's anti-pandering provision that was upheld in
Williams, users may not distribute, promote, or solicit material in a way
276. Conversely, a user whose child avatar engages in virtual sex with any other avatar
(adult or child) faces the same consequences, or lack thereof.
277. See MySpace homepage, www.myspace.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2009); see also
Facebook homepage, www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). MySpace and Facebook
are two of the more well-known, online social networks. See Steve Rosenbush, Facebook 's on
the Block, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 28, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2006/tc20060327_215976.htm.
278. See generally Wagner, supra note 178.
279. See generally id.
280. Compare Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2009), and
MySpace, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2009), with Meek-Prieto, supra note
10, at 89.
281. See generally Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2009); see
also MySpace, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
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that is intended to cause others to believe they will receive real child
pornography, or that the panderer believes contains such images.282 For
example, User 1 may not intend to persuade User 2, via their avatars, that
User 1 has pornographic images containing real children and will make
them available to User 2. This speech, though conducted In-world, would
be used to solicit a real-world exchange, regardless of whether User 1 in
fact has such material.283 Accordingly, such In-world speech is no different
than that of chat room users who assert the same offer, or real-world
individuals who tell others they will give or sell them real child
pornography. Thus, current law prohibits those who use Second Life in
any way that mirrors the defendant's speech in Williams284 and potentially
subjects the user to prosecution under PROTECT.
b. Pandering Virtual Child Pornography
Residents can also use Second Life to solicit virtual child
pornography.285 Consider the scenario in which a user creates multiple
avatars, some of them children,286 and retains complete control over them.
The user establishes a career in Second Life, or simply pursues a personal
hobby as a film producer. For his or her own amusement, and perhaps
even indulgence, the user creates a film depicting some of his or her child
avatars engaged in sexual activity with his or her other avatars. This is the
classic case of obviously virtual child pornography.287 Strictly speaking,
the user could not be prosecuted for possession of child pornography
because such images are clearly not "indistinguishable from" real
children. 288 What happens, however, when one of the user's avatars goes
out in the virtual "marketplace" and advertises that it (the avatar) has child
pornography it would like to sell or give away?
Where the user does not pander a virtual film in a way that "reflects
282. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(a)(3)(B) (2003).
283. Recall that even if the solicitor has only virtual child pornography, or regular adult
pornography, or no pornography at all, the solicitor is still subject to PROTECT's anti-pandering
provision. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
284. United States v, Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2006). While the defendant
in Williams indeed had actual child pornographic images and was charged for such, his speech
alone, suggesting he had those images, subjected him to separate criminal charges under
PROTECT. Id.
285. See Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 106-07.
286. While any user's individual account is only permitted one avatar, a user may create
multiple accounts from the same computer, thus creating multiple avatars.
287. See generally Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 89-90.
288. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. 2003); see also supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
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the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe ' 28 9 the film
contains images of real people, it must be presumed that the user solicitor,
recipient, and their respective avatars know the children depicted therein
are virtual. Under PROTECT, this speech is not proscribable for the
precise reason that neither solicitor nor recipient can reasonably believe the
images depict real children. 290  However, although Williams upheld
PROTECT's anti-pandering provision, an incongruity arises between the
implications of the provision and the Court's rationale in support of it.
29 1
The Williams Court distinguished the anti-pandering provision in
PROTECT from the overbroad Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
provision struck down in Ashcroft (the "conveys the impression"
provision).292 In doing so, it noted that under PROTECT, no actual
pornography (real, virtual, obscene, child, or otherwise) need even exist.
29 3
The Court did not want to make the underlying material the target of the
regulation, but rather just the pandering speech alone.294 But in support of
this goal, the Court made proscribable speech to the effect of "I have some
child pornography and I am willing to share it with you. ' 295 If made in a
chat room or in real life, such a statement would subject the declarant to
criminal penalties under PROTECT.296 When spoken In-world, however,
the nature of that speech is ambiguous: (1) is the user soliciting another
user to provide actual material in the real world (regardless of whether the
solicitor in fact has actual or virtual material, so long as it "reflects the
belief, or... is intended to cause another to believe" the material contains
real children);297 or (2) is the user soliciting, through its avatar, another
avatar to provide virtual material In-world (such as the aforementioned
"film")? Some might argue that because such speech is prohibited in every
other scenario (e.g., in a chat room, on MySpace, or in real life), identical
speech, when asserted in Second Life, should similarly be prohibited.
The implication of proscribing such speech in Second Life is critical.
In the situation discussed above where it must be presumed that both the
declarant (the soliciting user and its avatar) and the recipient are
interpreting the statement as initiating a purely In-world transfer, neither
289. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2003).
290. Id.
291. United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1852 (2008).
292. Id. at 1841; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
293. See Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1838.
294. Id. at 1838-39.
295. Id. at 1837-38.
296. Id. at 1838-39.
297. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2003).
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can reasonably entertain a subjective belief that the pornographic material
contains images of real children. Under the statutory language of
PROTECT, this speech would likely evade prosecution because it neither
"reflects the belief, [n]or ... is intended to cause another to believe" 298 that
the "film" contains real children. But under the Williams rationale, the
speech would subject the declarant to real-world prosecution via
PROTECT because the speech alone would be the target, rather than its
underlying content (i.e., the virtual film). 299 If that speech were proscribed
in a chat room or in real life, then under Williams, it would also be
proscribed in Second Life. 300  This result would ignore the critical
ambiguity that arises from the unique feature of Second Life-that for
every Resident, two identities attach (the controller and its avatar).
Consequently, Residents who pander virtual material harm no one,
particularly when both the solicitor and recipient understand that the
material is entirely virtual (as described above). 30  For one, those who
pander virtual material do not harm real children when they produce such
material.30 2 Moreover, Residents do not potentially harm real children
when they circulate such material because virtual child pornography has, at
best, a "contingent and indirect" link to child abuse.303 Finally, those who
pander such material do not harm real children by fueling the market for
real child pornography, most notably because virtual material and real child
pornography are not part of the same market.30 4
Opponents of lenient regulation of virtual conduct might argue that
potential deviants who enter Second Life may use it as a means to explore a
yet-unexplored fantasy, thereby inching closer to the eventual sexual
gratification with real-world children. Under this argument, Second Life
functions as a gateway to sexual abuse, either directly through child abuse
or indirectly by watching real child pornography. However, this view,
which advocates the elimination of a virtual market, ignores the fact that
doing so necessitates the use of the real market to satisfy a given deviant's
curiosities or desires. More specifically, without a virtual market, a
potential deviant would have one less outlet through which to safely
explore his or her curiosity. Ignoring this implication runs counter to the
298. Id.
299. 128 S. Ct. at 1838-39.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1844.
302. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002).
303. See id.; see also supra notes 257 and 259 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (noting the inherent difference between
virtual and illegal images as they relate to the pornographic market).
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ultimate goal of protecting real children. Therefore, although pandering
speech for virtual material subjects the user to In-world consequences for
breaking Second Life's policies, 305 it should not subject the user to real-
world penalties. To do so implicates and possibly violates fundamental
First Amendment rights.
3. Solicitation for Real-World Meetings
Like other social networks, Second Life can be used as a channel to
solicit meetings in the real world.30 6 When used in this manner, it operates
much like a chat room; therefore, the law regulating cyber conduct between
chat room users applies. 307 Relevant here, Second Life may set the stage
for two kinds of In-world meetings that may harm real children. First, an
adult-controlled avatar propositions a child avatar-ostensibly controlled
by a minor-to meet in the real world. This is done with the intent to
seduce or lure the alleged child into sexual activity. Second, one adult user
may proposition another adult user, whose avatar suggests its controller is a
fellow child pornography connoisseur, to meet in the real world to
exchange real child pornography. 30 8 The speech in these two scenarios
poses different potential harms to children. Therefore, if the law must
regulate the In-world conduct (i.e., real-world expression), it must
differentiate between the above scenarios and address them separately.30 9
a. Meeting to Seduce a Child
A user might use Second Life in an attempt to seduce a child for real-
world sex. Under applicable law, a user who solicits such a meeting is
subject to real-world prosecution, regardless of whether the solicitee is in
fact a minor.310 The solicitee receiving this proposition may be an adult, or
even a government agent posing as a child avatar in order to catch potential
defendants.311 However, because the culpability of the user lies in the
attempt to engage in sexual activity with a minor, an actual minor need not
305. Terms of Service, supra note 14.
306. FAQ, supra note 1.
307. Third Anniversary Thoughts, Second Life, June 23, 2006,
http://blog.secondlife.com/2OO6/O6/23/third-anniversary-thoughts/(on file with author).
308. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (2008).
309. Third Anniversary Thoughts, supra note 307.
310. § 2422(b).
311. See United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 2004) (involving a case where a
police officer posed as a teenage user).
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exist. 31 2 Second Life rightly provides no exception to real-world laws that
prohibit this conduct.31 3 Since this activity implicates child pornography
laws, it warrants no further analysis here.
b. Meeting to Exchange Material with Other Deviants
When users exclusively use Second Life to meet other child
pornography connoisseurs (producers, possessors, or any combination
thereof), they have options. Users can proposition other users for real-
world meetings to exchange actual child pornography. Alternatively, they
can indulge their deviant fantasies by keeping it strictly In-world by
soliciting meetings at In-world locales (e.g., a popular In-world bar) to
exchange virtual child pornography. In both scenarios, child pornographers
use Second Life as a forum to meet other users who share in their perverse
interests. However, PROTECT treats the two differently. In the first
situation, PROTECT prohibits the controller from using Second Life this
way, when the speech proposing the real-world meeting "reflects the belief,
or... is intended to cause another to believe" that the real-world
pornography depicts real children. 314  PROTECT does not, however,
prohibit the latter situation because no reasonable person would believe
that the pornography showcased In-world depicts real children, or images
315that are "indistinguishable from" real children.
Some argue that the solicitation for In-world meetings should be
regulated because a pedophile might use Second Life to meet other like-
minded users to gain support, affirm and share fantasies, or to exchange
child abuse tactics.316 Under this view, both the user and the willing
recipient would be subjected to real-world legal consequences, just like
those incurred for a meeting involving the exchange of child pornography
in the real world.317 While this argument addresses some of the state
interests set forth in Ferber318 that gave rise to the child pornography
exception, it fails to account for the specific harms the Court sought to
prevent in both Ashcroft and Williams.
319
As discussed above, virtual child pornography does not involve, and
312. § 2422(a).
313. See id.; see also Terms of Service, supra note 14.
314. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2003).
315. § 2256(8)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
316. See Meek-Prieto, supra note 10, at 106-07.
317. See id. at 106.
318. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
319. Specifically, the Court sought to prevent the exploitation of real children during
production, permanent humiliation, and damage to reputation by ongoing circulation.
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therefore does not potentially harm, a real child. Consequently, the
rationale supporting the child pornography exception does not support
prohibiting the production, or subsequent circulation, of such material.
Proscribing this In-world speech is not for the purpose of preventing harm
to a child, but is instead intended to prevent interaction between fellow
child pornographers. This is analogous to prohibiting the speech of two
strangers who meet in a park, discover a shared practice of sexually
abusing children, and swap techniques. While certainly contemptible, such
speech is clearly constitutionally protected and thus cannot be prohibited.32°
For this reason, the use of Second Life as a forum to meet other pedophiles
does not justify banning In-world discussions, meetings, or virtual
exchanges. Accordingly, the speech of a user who does not solicit any
proscribed real-world conduct falls outside the scope of PROTECT and
thus should retain First Amendment protection.
V. CONCLUSION
The government may regulate speech, but only within the bounds of
the Constitution. The Supreme Court has interpreted the limits of the First
Amendment and identified several exceptions where certain public interests
outweigh the value of the speech in question.32' As relevant here, the
public's interest in protecting children justifies the child pornography
exception.322 The Court's willingness to deny protection to this form of
speech is based on three potential harms that child pornography poses to
children.323 First, the production of child pornography results in the
immediate abuse and degradation of a child.324 Second, the advertisement,
sale, and subsequent viewing of child pornography exploits the child (and
children in general), thereby permanently documenting the abuse and
damaging the child's reputation. 325 Third, the circulation and possession of
child pornography advances two harms: (1) it may induce the viewer to
directly abuse a child; and/or (2) it may fuel the market for more material,
increasing the demand for production.326 For these reasons, the Court
refuses to extend First Amendment protection to speech that causes these
320. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
321. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); see also supra note 7
accompanying text.
322. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
323. Id. at 759-62.
324. See id. at 756 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
325. See id. at 759.
326. See id. at 759-60; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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harms.327
However, the advent and evolution of virtual child pornography has
blurred the line separating protected and unprotected speech.328 Whereas
the creation of real child pornography inherently involves harm to children,
the creation of virtual child pornography does not. In Second Life, one
may produce, solicit, and exchange virtual child pornography in ways that
do not involve, resemble, or harm any actual children. Nevertheless, given
differing moral standards in our diverse society, some may genuinely fear
that the entanglement of children and sexual fantasies inherently harms real
329children, and that this speech deserves no First Amendment protection.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the existence of virtual child
pornography in Second Life does not directly harm any real children.
Unlike real pornographers, virtual child pornographers do not require real
children to participate in production of the images; rather, Residents create
images by manipulating the movements of a user's avatar. No actual child
is thereby degraded or abused in the process. Furthermore, the possibility
that a child bypasses the age restrictions and sneaks onto Second Life does
not justify the total ban on sexual expression in Second Life.33° Under this
rationale, a lot of otherwise protected speech would fall outside the scope
of the First Amendment simply because a child might encounter it. The
Court has consistently recognized that speech suitable for adults should not
be banned simply because it "may fall into the hands of children. 331
Moreover, those who would argue for greater legal restrictions on
virtual child pornography have no conclusive empirical evidence that
indicates that because virtual child pornography is allowed in Second Life,
virtual deviants will inevitably abuse or molest real-world children.
332
While studies show that viewing real child pornography fuels the market
for more like material, no evidence exists that the same is true for virtual
child pornography.333 Rather, the very nature of Second Life suggests the
opposite. In Second Life, users have the opportunity to interact with the
327. Id. at 765.
328. See, e.g., Meek-Prieto, supra note 10.
329. See, e.g., id.
330. Presumably, a child that sneaks onto Second Life is "harmed" by becoming
desensitized from viewing its avatar having sex. This would occur regardless of whether the
child employed an adult or child avatar. Because the risk of a child unlawfully accessing Second
Life always exists, a child posing as an adult would subject an unsuspecting user (and its
controller) to punishment for simply dating what they believe is an avatar controlled by an adult.
331. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002); see also supra note 227
accompanying text.
332. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250; see also supra note 256 accompanying text.
333. See Ashcrofi, 535 U.S. at 250.
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subjects of their arousal; actual pornography, on the other hand, avails its
viewers of no such pleasure. Seemingly, a user has more to gain, and less
to lose, by confining his or her deviant conduct to Second Life.
Nevertheless, participation in Second Life potentially involves
objectionable conduct. The creators of Second Life now prohibit "sexual
age-play" and discontinue the accounts of any members who use their
Second Lives in this manner. 334 Such In-world regulation, however, should
not result in real-world criminal penalties because the In-world conduct
harms no one, adult or child. If anything, Second Life serves a purpose
beyond that which the real world can provide: it allows individuals to
pursue the most perverse fantasies without harm to anyone. Simply put,
Second Life is good for society. But like a first life, Second Life just ain't
perfect.
Sabryne Coleman*
334. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
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